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STRUCTURAL REFORM
PROGRESS IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
By Stijn Claessens
Introduction
This article investigates the progress in corporate 
governance reform in Korea since 1997 as well as 
current corporate governance challenges. It focuses 
on corporate governance issues and, as such, does 
not analyze other aspects—overall reform and com-
petitiveness of the corporate sector, macroeconomic 
policies, and fi nancial sector reforms—these have 
also been crucial to Korea’s recovery to date and will 
remain essential to sustain growth going forward. It 
concludes that much progress has been achieved in 
corporate governance reform, with many of the main 
corporate governance defi ciencies contributing to the 
crisis having been eliminated. Corporate sector per-
formance has improved, with corporate sector profi t-
ability generally restored and investment becoming 
more rational. Financial vulnerabilities have declined, 
as leverage has fallen and maturity and currency mis-
matches have been reduced.
Improvements to corporate governance in Korea can 
be attributed to a combination of multiple factors, most 
importantly ownership changes, including greater 
outside (foreign) ownership, and deep institutional 
reforms including strengthening of minority rights and 
requiring greater representation of outside directors. 
Buttressing these changes have been government-led 
initiatives, especially measures aimed at large and 
distressed corporations, and a tight framework for cor-
porate fi nancial restructuring; a broad set of other in-
stitutional reforms covering, among other procedures, 
accounting and auditing, including increased liability 
for proper fi nancial reporting, improved bankruptcy 
restructuring, and other forms of fi nancial restructuring 
procedures; fi nancial sector reform, including banking 
system recapitalization and restructuring; and changes 
in ownership structures in the fi nancial sector.
The question is whether corporate governance needs 
to be further enhanced or modifi ed in light of past ex-
periences, global lessons, or changing circumstances. 
Some of the corporate governance problems preceding 
the crisis still remain today. In spite of many reforms, 
the corporate governance practices of Korean corpora-
tions are still perceived to be below those of fi rms in 
many comparator countries. Ownership structures re-
main characterized by high wedges between cash-fl ow 
rights and control rights, with adverse consequences 
for minority shareholders and resource allocation. Bar-
riers to entry for small- and medium-size enterprises 
(SMEs), such as the time and cost to open up a busi-
ness, are still large, and they hinder effi cient growth. 
More generally, Korea’s relatively low level of invest-
ment coupled with generally unimpressive profi tability 
and low productivity growth raise some doubts about 
the quality of corporate governance. And the advent of 
more knowledge-intensive production, with less need 
for investment in fi xed assets, puts a greater emphasis 
on high-quality corporate governance. Further corpo-
rate governance reforms will be necessary to assure 
the right level and type of investments, with a proper 
risk-return balance.
Corporate Governance before 1997 and 
Reform since 1997
Problems before 1997
Korea’s corporate governance problems before the 
1997 fi nancial crisis that led to large fi nancial vulner-
abilities and weak performance have been well docu-
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mented.1 Many of the corporate governance problems 
arose from a high concentration of ownership control 
particularly among the large chaebol, the predomi-
nance of business groups in Korea, and the various 
interlinks among corporations. These features meant 
poor transparency and weak corporate governance, 
which in turn often facilitated an ineffi cient allocation 
of resources and much risk taking.
The weak governance structure was further aggravated 
by two factors. One was the generally passive nature 
of the Korean banking system, with its limited risk 
management and credit analysis skills and the still 
very large role of the government, both directly as 
an owner and indirectly as an overseer of banks. The 
second factor was the existence of many links between 
the corporate and fi nancial sectors, most notably the 
control by the chaebol over many merchant banks 
and other nonbank fi nancial institutions. The result-
ing lack of overall market discipline was refl ected in 
the limited exit of weak corporations. In the capital 
markets, poor corporate governance translated itself 
into expropriation, low stock market valuation, and 
low rates of return for minority shareholders.
Improvements since 1997
In hindsight these problems have been identifi ed and 
documented extensively as important factors behind 
the 1997 crisis, but at the time of the crisis too little 
emphasis was given to them. Thanks to vigorous 
policy actions following the crisis, however, much 
has been achieved in terms of improving the corporate 
governance regime. Actions have included a mixture 
of government-issued guidelines such as the required 
elimination of cross-guarantees, the forced reduction 
in fi nancial leverage, special requests for the larger 
chaebol to reduce their investments and consolidate 
their operations, a specifi c process for large-scale 
corporate fi nancial restructuring, recapitalization and 
fi nancial restructuring of the banking system, fi nancial 
sector reform, and increased market pressures facili-
tated by a number of institutional reforms.
Across a wide spectrum, data confi rm that measures 
have led to reduced fi nancial vulnerabilities and im-
 
proved corporate performance. Leverage has declined, 
debt maturity profi les have lengthened, and cash bal-
ances have sharply increased. Both profi tability and 
investment behavior have improved, especially among 
the chaebol. Important to all this has been the large 
exit of weaker fi rms. This restructuring has been ac-
companied by somewhat improved direct ownership 
structures, including larger foreign ownership and 
reduction in cross-ownership among related parties, 
which have facilitated higher transparency in man-
agement and allowed for more effi ciency in resource 
allocation. However, signs of weakness and unfi nished 
restructuring needs still remain.
Corporate Governance Reforms
It was not just corporate governance reforms, but 
also other factors that allowed for the rapid progress 
in the corporate sector. These additional factors in-
cluded large government-led initiatives immediately 
following the fi nancial crisis; drastic restructuring of 
the fi nancial system; and many improvements in the 
institutional environment, notably covering the frame-
works for corporate fi nancial distress and the disclo-
sure and quality of information. Corporate governance 
changes have been due to three forces: government-led 
initiatives, improvements in the overall institutional 
environment, and changes in ownership structures.
Immediately following the crisis, a number of mea-
sures, such as the elimination of cross-guarantees and 
the prohibition on ownership links, aimed directly 
at improving fi nancial and general transparency and 
corporate governance structures in the large chaebol. 
Through legal and regulatory changes, there have been 
many improvements in the institutional framework 
for corporate governance; also part of the fi nancial 
restructuring and reforms were considerable changes 
in the ownership structures of many corporations:
• Minority shareholder rights strengthened by 
lowering the threshold for various shareholder 
initiatives,
• Outside board of directors introduced,
1. Republic of Korea: Establishing a New Foundation for Sustained Growth, vol. 1, Report no. 19595-KO (Washington, D.C.: World 
Bank, November 1999); “Republic of Korea: Article IV Consultations,” IMF Staff Report (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary 
Fund, 1998); Economic Survey: Korea (Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 1999).
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• Fiduciary duty of corporate directors introduced,
•   Cumulative voting for directors allowed,
• Debt guarantees between chaebol subsidiaries 
prohibited,
• External auditors and corporate accounting offi cers 
subject to stiffer penalties,
• Approval by the board of directors required for 
related-party transactions,
• Introduction of economic criteria for evaluating 
applications for corporate reorganization,
• Ceiling on foreign shareholdings in individual 
companies abolished in 1998,
• All forms of mergers and acquisitions, including 
hostile takeovers by foreigners, permitted,
• Class action suits introduced for all listed compa-
nies,
• Ability of chaebol to exercise power over fi nancial 
affi liates restricted, and
• Amendment to the Commercial Code to make 
managers and controlling shareholders more ac-
countable to minority shareholders.
Assessments of Corporate Governance Today
The improvements in corporate governance and 
shareholder capitalism have made the management 
of chaebol more transparent and are believed to have 
contributed to alleviating the “Korean discount” in 
the stock market.3 This in turn has led to the better 
functioning of equity markets and an improvement 
in the allocation of resources. Although in the past 
equity returns were very low, with dividends low and 
overall returns often below those on government and 
corporate bonds even though equity volatility was 
 
higher, equity returns have been much higher since 
the crisis. Most important, the equity cost of capital 
has become a better guide for corporations’ invest-
ment opportunities, and the allocation of resources 
has therefore been improved.
It is diffi cult to say defi nitively, however, how much 
of the change is due to the upgrade of the corporate 
governance regime, how much to factors such as 
increased competition and further globalization, and 
how much to changes in ownership structures away 
from insiders and toward much more demanding 
investors. One reasonably objective way to assess 
the contribution of the institutional framework to the 
improved performance is to score the formal corporate 
governance regime in Korea relative to that of other 
countries (Table 1). Korea scores quite well compared 
with other Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) and Asian countries. For 
example, the disclosure and shareholder suit indexes 
2. Economic Survey: Korea (Paris: OECD, 1999, 2001, 2003, 2005, and 2007); Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes 
(ROSC), Republic of Korea: Corporate Governance (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, September 2003).
3. Lee Jong-wha and Rhee Chang-yong, “Crisis and Recovery: What We Have Learned from the South Korean Experience,” Asian 
Economic Policy Review 2 (2007).

















5.2 4.4 6.1 5.2 
OECD 6.3 5 6.6 6
Brazil 5 7 4 5.3 
China 10 1 4 5
Germany 5 5 5 5
India 7 4 7 6
Indonesia 8 5 3 5.3 
Japan 7 6 8 7
Korea 7 2 7 5.3 
Malaysia 10 9 7 8.7 
Philippines 1 2 7 3.3 
Thailand 10 2 6 6
United
States 
7 9 9 8.3 
Source: Doing Business 2007: How to Reform?
(Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2006). 
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are better than the OECD average. But director liability 
remains far below that average, making the overall 
shareholder index below average.
But it is also clear that, as elsewhere, a divergence ex-
ists between the regulatory environment and (market 
perceptions about) corporate governance practices in 
Korea.4 Among the nine sampled countries in East 
Asia, Korea is ranked far ahead of Hong Kong and 
Singapore in terms of principles and rules of corporate 
governance (Table 2). In corporate governance prac-
tices, however, Korea is perceived by fund managers 
and analysts to be signifi cantly behind these two 
countries (although still ahead of most other East Asian 
countries). With a regulatory framework for corporate 
governance now largely set in place, it is therefore 
important to concentrate efforts on implementing and 
enforcing rules and regulations.
 
Further confi rmation of the differences between rules 
and corporate governance practices comes from the 
annual 2005 Credit Lyonnais Asia Pacifi c survey 
(Table 3), where Korea is ranked in the middle of 
all East Asian countries in both rules and corporate 
governance practices. The weak corporate governance 
practices of corporations are further confi rmed in the 
ratings of corporate governance practices by com-
mercial agencies such as GovernanceMetrics Interna-
tional (GMI). Out of 49 countries, the average GMI 
corporate governance score for Korean corporations 
was only 2.31, which ranks Korea as fourth from the 
worst. Corporations in all Asian countries rated bet-
ter, and no OECD countries rated worse than Korea 
(Table 4). Also, a study on the evolution of corporate 
governance practices in various markets suggests less 
improvement in Korea.
Corporate governance is still weak in practice because 
some of the pre-crisis deeper underlying reasons for 
the problems remain. Most of the corporate gover-
nance problems in Korea center—as they do in most 
emerging markets and many developed countries—on 
the confl icts between minority and controlling share-
holders, the latter often still represented in manage-
ment. For most Korean corporations, there exists large 
outright control by insiders—only a handful of share 
or small-cash-fl ow owners are involved—allowing 
insiders to fend off market pressures. And chaebol 
with a lower ratio of ownership continue to exploit 
the treasury stock holding system as an effective tool 
to defend against takeover attempts. Conversely, 
those fi rms whose shares are largely held by major 
shareholders other than the controlling shareholders 
and their affi liates tend to maintain higher ratios of 
treasury stock. It may even be the case that during 
the past decade insiders have increased their control 
stakes and acquired more assets, and some argue that 
the regulations on circular investments were and still 
4. Some of this is confi rmed by Stephen Y. L. Cheung and Hasung Jang, “Scorecard on Corporate Governance in East Asia,” Working 
Paper no. 13 (Waterloo, Ontario: Center for International Governance Innovation, December 2006). 
5. Using market data, G. De Nicolo, L. Laeven, and K. Ueda, in “Corporate Governance Quality: Trends and Real Effects,” Working 
Paper no. 06/293 (Washington, D.C.: IMF, 2007) show that, with the use of a corporate governance quality index that consists of 
accounting standards, earnings opacity, and stock price synchronicity, Korea is ranked not only quite behind developed countries but 
also below the average Asian country. Although the accounting standard indicator is the highest, earnings seem to be manipulated 
and stock prices do not refl ect corporate governance problems quite rapidly. This result is consistent with the survey fi ndings of 
Cheung and Jang, “Scorecard on Corporate Governance in East Asia.”
6. Youn Tae-hoon, “Analysis on the Takeover Defense and Treasury Stock Holdings [in Korean],” in Studies on the Market for 
Corporate Control in Korea, ed. Youn Tae-hoon, Research Monograph no. 669 (Seoul: Korea Development Institute, 2005).






Index Ranking Index Ranking 
Philippines 3.61 1 2.08 7
China 3.54 2 1.72 8
Korea 3.38 3 2.68 3
Thailand 3.20 4 2.60 4
Taiwan 2.98 5 2.50 6
Indonesia 2.92 6 1.57 9
Malaysia 2.62 7 2.60 4
Singapore 2.57 8 4.00 1
Hong
Kong
2.48 9 3.88 2
Source: Stephen Y. L. Cheung and Hasung Jang,  
“Scorecard on Corporate Governance in East Asia,”  
Working Paper no. 13 (Waterloo, Ontario: Center for  
International Governance Innovation, December 2006). 
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are being circumvented today. Also in the immediate 
aftermath of the fi nancial crisis, although rules were 
in place to prevent this from happening, the large cor-











China 5.3 4.2 5 7.5 2.3 4.8 
Hong Kong 6.6 5.8 7.5 9 4.6 6.7 
Indonesia 5.3 2.7 3.8 6 2.7 4
Korea 6.1 5 5 8 5 5.8 
Malaysia 7.1 5 5 9 4.6 6
Philippines 5.8 3.1 5 8.5 3.1 5
Singapore 7.9 6.5 8.1 9.5 5.8 7.4 
Thailand 6.1 3.8 5 8.5 3.5 5.3 
Sources: East Asian Finance: The Road to Robust Markets (Washington: World Bank, 2006); Credit Lyonnais 
Securities Asia, Emerging Markets Survey (Hong Kong: Asian Corporate Governance Association, 2005). 
Note: IGAAP = international generally accepted accounting principles. 
7. Lim Young-jae and Jun Sung-in, “Circulatory Shareholding of the Group Companies: Roles of Market Discipline and Supervisory 
Discipline [in Korean],” KDI Policy Forum (Seoul: Korea Development Institute, 2006).
porations were among the few able to acquire assets, 
thereby increasing their asset base.
Anecdotal examples confi rm the diffi culties that out-
side investors have in affecting management and con-
trolling shareholders. Hyundai Motors, for example, 
has had periodic demands from labor unions for wage 
hikes, to which management has often acquiesced at 
the cost of minority shareholders’ interests. One reason 
is that, without a market for corporate control and with 
the predominance of controlling shareholders, Hyun-
dai Motors and other corporations like it do not face 
enough market pressure. Although direct ownership 
structures changed after the crisis, including through 
larger foreign ownership, until control changes from a 
small group of insiders to a larger group of dispersed 
shareholders, many of the corporate governance 
problems will remain. Importantly, the valuation of 
Korean fi rms, while improved, is still below that in 
many other advanced countries. As of the end of 2005, 
Korean fi rms were valued with a Tobin’s Q of 1.02, 
signifi cantly lower than fi rms of most other OECD 
and East Asian countries (Table 5).
For the SMEs, as in many other countries, corporate 
governance is usually even weaker than for the larger 
listed corporations. At the same time, and perhaps 
surprisingly given the attention most often paid to the 
Table 4: GMI Country Ranking Based on Individual  
Corporations’ Ratings, Selected Countries, 2006 
Country (no. 










USA (1,739) 7.22 1 4
Thailand (8) 5.75 2 15
Germany (66) 5.66 3 16




Malaysia (16) 4.72 6 29
India (24) 4.67 7 31
Japan (409) 4.01 8 38
Indonesia (6) 3.83 9 41
Brazil (23) 3.23 10 42
China (17) 2.94 11 43





Source: GovernanceMetrics International, September 18, 2006
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largest corporations, SMEs are a large part of Korea’s 
economy, up to 50 percent of manufacturing output 
and approximately 32 percent of exports. To improve 
SME governance—a diffi cult task—Korean com-
mercial banks will have to play a large role because 
they, as lenders, have a large stake in the governance 
of their borrowers. Another important responsibility in 
improving corporate governance of the smaller fi rms 
will fall to the accounting and auditing profession. Be-
cause weaknesses in corporate governance among the 
large fi rms in Korea tend to spill over to SMEs—many 
SMEs are domestic suppliers and subcontractors—
improvements in large fi rms’ corporate governance 
will go a long way toward aiding SMEs’ corporate 
governance.
Corporate Governance Challenges
Many observers agree that in specifi c areas corporate 
governance reform efforts still need to be intensifi ed to 
assure an effi ciently and prudently operating corporate 
sector in Korea. At the same time, new challenges fac-
ing the corporate sector have come up recently.
Remaining Challenges
Many efforts continue to be spent on improving and 
deepening corporate governance rules. The overall 
direction of these policies is in further enhancing the 
role of the market and in the use of market-based meth-
ods to determine how corporations are monitored and 
governed and how fi nancial diffi culties are resolved. 
Consequently, many changes have involved delegating 
to the market—instead of to regulating authorities, as 
was the case in the past—more of the tasks of ensuring 
compliance with the new rules. 
This delegation has been a learning experience for 
many market participants and authorities. As in many 
other countries, the full benefi ts are yet to been seen, 
while risks have arisen in the meantime. For example, 
analysis shows that outside directors do not yet play a 
large enough role in improving corporate governance, 
and outside directors on management boards have 
yet to act independently of the executive direc-
tors. Although the responsibilities and incentives for 
outside directors are quite well established, outside 
directors have been lacking in their responsibilities 
and corresponding activities to improve corporate 
transparency. Outside directors have tended not to at-
tend regular board meetings and often have entrusted 
their voting rights to the executive directors who 
effectively appointed them.9 Other evidence points 
to continued corporate governance weaknesses and 
severe agency costs.
More thus needs to be done, given global trends in 
corporate governance and capital markets. The es-
tablishment of a sounder corporate behavior requires 
not only improving the overall corporate governance 
and restructuring frameworks but also diligently 
maintaining the current rules or introducing new direct 
prohibitions and interventions. Tighter regulations 
on the circular shareholding of conglomerates are 
needed, for example, as there still exist concerns that 
 
Table 5: International Comparison of Tobin’s Q,  
Selected Countries, 1995, 2000, and 2005
Country 1995 2000 2005
India 2.56 3.61 2.22 
United States 1.91 3.20 1.83 
Indonesia 2.29 1.21 1.50 
Brazil 0.47 0.48 1.33 
Thailand 1.58 0.93 1.33 
OECD average 1.07 2.02 1.32 
Malaysia 1.83 1.15 1.17 
China 1.45 3.09 1.14 
Germany 0.76 1.29 1.12 
Philippines 2.03 0.90 1.09 
Japan 1.00 3.17 1.05 
Korea 0.82 0.93 1.04 
Source: International Monetary Fund, Corporate Sector 
 Vulnerability Utility, as based on Thomson Financial’s 
Worldscope database. 
Note: Tobin’s Q ratio is approximated as the market  
capitalization weighted averages of the market value of  
equity plus book value of debt, divided by the book value  
of assets. 
8. Cho Sung-bin, “A Study on Agency Costs of Korean Firms [in Korean],” KDI Research Monograph no. 717 (Seoul: Korea 
Development Institute, 2006).
9. Cheung and Jang, “Scorecard on Corporate Governance in East Asia.”
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the chaebol circumvent these rules. Several controlling 
shareholders’ dominant control over affi liated com-
panies through cross-shareholding greatly increased 
between 1998 and 2001 when the government, in 
order to facilitate corporate restructuring, removed 
the regulation on the total amount of shareholding in 
other companies.10 As a result, the controlling share-
holders’ voting rights have increased via their affi liated 
companies quite rapidly. In addition, some believe that 
circulatory shareholding creates voting rights among 
affi liates without requiring any cash outlays or other 
costs or expenses.11 This is an infringement on minor-
ity shareholders’ rights by artifi cially reducing their 
relative voting shares.
Another important policy issue is the role of corpora-
tions in the ownership of fi nancial institutions. Many 
observers—including, for example, Standard & Poor’s 
in 2005 when it was upgrading Korea’s sovereign 
rating—have noted that preventing control of the 
fi nancial system by large corporations and business 
groups is crucial to preventing the recurrence of a 
fi nancial crisis. Recently, however, the inability of 
nonfi nancial fi rms to acquire stock in Korea’s commer-
cial banks—the limitation was a 4 percent maximum 
ownership stake—has been relaxed. The relaxation of 
bank ownership rules and allowing more ownership by 
corporations might lead, however, to misallocations 
and introduce systemic risks, especially because Ko-
rea has much larger business groups than most other 
(advanced) countries. Besides the concerns about 
systemic risks, worries about economic power con-
centration and concerns about fair competition have in 
many countries led to limits on the ownership of banks 
by nonfi nancial corporations.12 Because ownership 
has already been somewhat liberalized, it is crucial 
that existing measures are enforced at the same time, 
especially those rules governing confl icts of interest 
and transparency, and that additional measures be 
 
 
taken, such as increased disclosure on related-party 
transactions.
Some of the current policies being considered by the 
incoming Lee Myung-Bak government would impact 
on corporate governance. In particular, the propos-
als to ease restrictions on the investments by large 
conglomerates in related organizations, the further 
relaxation of restrictions on investments in other 
corporations and fi nancial entities, the removal of 
the 200 percent limit on leverage, and the reduction 
in taxes on intragroup dividends would strengthen 
the role of business groups. If these proposals are to 
be adopted, it would be imperative that at the same 
time transparency, fi nancial reporting, and corporate 
governance requirements in general be enhanced as 
well. The move toward greater use of holding com-
panies could help clarify organizational structures 
and complement such changes, but should not lead 
to favorable treatment of the chaebol. Any planned 
reorganization of the respective responsibilities of the 
fi nance ministry, the Financial Supervisory Commis-
sion, and Financial Supervisory Service would have 
to ensure that enforcement of corporate governance 
rules does not diminish.
New Challenges
Besides these existing reform issues, larger challenges 
for Korea’s corporate sector lie ahead; the challenges 
have to do with the overall business environment, 
especially in terms of fostering innovation. It is clear 
that going forward the economic model will have to be 
different from the past. Rapid accumulation of input 
factors combined with solid productivity growth have 
allowed for Korea’s impressive growth for the past 
35 years, but the limits are being reached. Increased 
competition from other countries makes it less clear 
how Korea can repeat the fast growth of the past de-
11. Lim and Jun, “Circulatory Shareholding of the Group Companies”; the authors suggest as a more effective regulatory tool, an 
ex post system in which minority shareholders, whose rights are infringed, are allowed to fi le a low-cost lawsuit asking the court to 
nullify the resolution of the general meeting of shareholders.
12. Although other advanced countries generally do not ban nonfi nancial fi rms from controlling banks, in most countries such 
investment is rare; see “Republic of Korea: Selected Issues,” IMF Country Report no. 06/381 (Washington, D.C.: International 
Monetary Fund, 8 September 2006).
10. Lim Kyung-mook and Cho Sung-bin, “The Role of Equity Investment in Corporate Control of the Large Business Conglomerates 
in Korea [in Korean],” in Studies on the Market for Corporate Control in Korea, ed. Youn Tae-hoon, Research Monograph no. 669 
(Seoul: Korea Development Institute, 2005).
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cades, and Korea needs new sources of growth. Part 
of the solution will have to involve a better business 
environment and more focus on fostering innovation, 
and all must be supported by better corporate gover-
nance. Following are some specifi c areas of corporate 
governance that need to show improvement.
Chaebol have control rights that far exceed their 
cash-fl ow rights. Although the rules protecting inves-
tors are now largely comparable with those in other 
OECD countries (with the exception of liability of 
directors), corporate governance is still found want-
ing, as can be seen in the ratings of investors and 
other agencies. Much of this is due to the chaebol’s 
having control rights far exceeding their cash-fl ow 
rights. This still occurs in part because the chaebol 
exercise indirect control over their fi rms through 
institutional investors’ ownership. For example, the 
controlling shareholders of the 13 investment trust 
companies with market shares of more than 2 percent 
are either chaebol (6) or banks (7).14 Chaebol also 
control many nonbank fi nancial institutions; they 
control, for example, more than half of the insurance 
and securities companies. Because of their indirect 
powers over institutional shareholders, insiders often 
dominate control in Korean chaebol at the expense of 
other minority shareholders.
Poor implementation of rules. The system of outside 
members on the boards of directors needs to be re-
formed. The proportion of outside directors appointed 
by the largest or the major shareholders is very high, 76 
percent in 2003;15 thus, outside directors are unlikely 
to play an active whistle-blower role and oversee the 
activities of management.
Capital markets are still relatively passive in 
corporate governance. Although there has been 
more active investor engagement on some corporate 
governance issues that has been aided by sharehold-
 
 
ers activist groups such as People’s Solidarity for 
Participatory Democracy, participation in general by 
domestic investors is limited, in part because of con-
fl icts of interest. Foreign investors, except for a few 
well-publicized instances, are too widely dispersed 
to play effectively the role of active agents. The level 
of foreign direct investment is still relatively low in 
Korea, and this limits further another form of corporate 
governance pressure.
The fundamental role of corporations in Korea’s 
economy is undergoing questioning. This reassess-
ment is happening at the same time that the basic 
corporate governance principles and practices are 
still being put in place or tested. Corporations are, for 
example, increasingly being asked to play a social 
role in the country. Under the outgoing administration, 
more emphasis was put on balanced growth, with a 
particular focal point on alleviating bipolarization in 
various segments: these include issues of urban vs. 
rural areas; large enterprises vs. SMEs; management 
vs. labor; and permanent laborers vs. temporary la-
borers. Corporations, especially large ones that have 
benefi ted during Korea’s expeditious growth periods, 
are asked to shoulder the costs of the country’s social 
safety net. One of the challenges to large corporations 
is that these additional burdens coupled with global 
competitive pressures push them to diversify to other 
sectors, which sometimes causes them more diffi culty. 
For example, they are shifting more of their operations 
overseas and relying less upon Korean SMEs to meet 
their production needs. As a result, SMEs are under 
further pressure and go into more distress. Policies that 
impose large social costs on corporations are not likely 
to be viable in the era of globalization. Instead, in order 
to survive, straitjackets on corporate activities should 
be removed and more incentives to innovation should 
be provided, while transparent corporate governance is 
fi rmly put in place to assure economic fairness.
13. Economic Survey of Korea 2005 (Paris: OECD, September 2005); World Bank Institute and Korea Development Institute, “Korea 
as a Knowledge Economy: Evolutionary Process and Lessons Learned” (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2006); and “Republic of 
Korea: Selected Issues,” IMF Country Report no. 06/381. 
14. Lim, Young-jae, “Institutional Shareholders, Chaebol Agency Costs, and Public Policy in Korea,” in Institutional and Policy 
Reforms to Enhance Corporate Effi ciency in Korea, ed. Cho Lee-jay, Somi Seong, and Lee Sang-hyop, 121–65 (Seoul: Korea 
Development Institute, 2007).
15. Cho, “A Study on Agency Costs of Korean Firms [in Korean].”
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Concluding Remarks
Thanks to strong policy actions, reform measures, and 
market pressures, Korea has made great progress in 
improving its corporate governance regime. Neverthe-
less, concerns remain, including about implementa-
tion and enforcement of corporate governance rules, 
the low level of outside investors, the (increasing) 
role of family ownership in the large chaebol, and 
the associated large wedge between ownership and 
control. New corporate governance issues have come 
up as they have been triggered by concern about the 
general competitiveness of Korea’s corporate sector. 
Increased global competition makes continued corpo-
rate governance reform necessary and requires a more 
vibrant services sector and SME sector; this has in turn 
led to a continued need to reform the overall business 
environment, to lower entry barriers, and to adopt 
policies fostering innovative behavior of corporations 
consistent with appropriate risk sharing.
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